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BOOK REVIEW

Multinational Enterprises in the West and
East
Reviewed by Jeffrey L. Brown
MultinationalEnterprises in the West and East, by Leon Zurawicki.
Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn,
The Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767. ISBN 90286-0419-7. Pages xi, 207. $27.50. (hardbound).
Rarely outside the classrooms of Macroeconomics 405 can pages of
algebraic equations be found devoted to the principle that by artificially
controlling certain assumptions, an interesting result can be obtained.
Programmed into the computer at the University of Warsaw are such assumptions as "buyers' decisions are taken at random," 1 and "firms may
reduce their deliveries and production to any extent. . without any cost
increase per unit of produce."'3 If the first assumption is true, even in a
so-called commodity market, the purchasing departments of most multinational enterprises are grossly overstaffed. Admittedly the latter assumption fails to take into account economies and diseconomies of scale.
The formula goes on and on and, assuredly, is of unquestioned value to
someone sophisticated in such matters. For an international attorney concerned with multinational commerce, other aspects of the book are likely
to be more relevant.'
In an overview, the book is devoted to a detailed description of the
perceived characteristics and motivations of the Western multinational
enterprise (MNE) and a comparison with those of the so-called Socialist
common enterprise (SCE). In the atmosphere of competing demands, the
author analyzes examples of East-West industrial cooperation and discusses the potential for East-West-South initiatives.

Jeffrey L. Brown is associate corporate counsel and director of international law, JohnsManville Corporation, Denver Colorado. B.A., 1964, Penn State University; J.D., 1967, University of Denver College of Law.
1. L.

ZURAWICKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN THE WEST AND EAST

13 (1979).

2. Id. at 17.
3. For an analysis and comparison of variable, marginal, and average costs and their
effect on pricing, see Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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An MNE, according to the author,' typically enjoys a dominant position in more than one national market. It exists in an oligopolistic industry characterized by "soft" competition in which defensive behavior is
preferred to offensive reaction, and price competition is kept at a minimum by adherence to the "rules of the game." Global marketing and capital strategies of MNE's allow for geographical mobility: an international
presence economically independent and outside of individual countries
within which they operate. Through devices such as transfer pricing,
management fees, royalties, research and development charges, and credit
policies, profits can be allocated among related companies owned or controlled by the MNE in such a way as to maximize earnings within jurisdictions having favorable tax laws and strong currencies.
Exports are explained as a reflection of the higher fixed costs typical
of large Western MNE's and their corresponding need to expand into
other markets and utilize excess capacity. This applies particularly in a
stagnant or highly competitive domestic economy.
Differences in cost of living (for example, raw material and labor)
frequently dictate the desirability of foreign investment or supplement
diminishing export markets. The author regrets that MNE's are better
organized than international labor, but recognizes the difficulty of organizing workers in another country where the living standards are disparate and differences are accentuated by distance and culture.
The author adopts the position attributed to trade unions that in the
long run, activities of MNE's tend to reduce employment opportunities at
home even though foreign subsidiaries often provide a short-term source
for exports of components, materials, and intellectual property used in
the manufacturing process. This assumes, of course, that the host country
will be content to import foreign goods and services indefinitely, a proposition which is clearly contrary to the goals the author describes for the
Socialist countries, that is, the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).5
In summary, the author sees MNE's as a threat to the economic sovereignty of the countries within which they operate, both developed and
developing. Against the concerns of MNE's for maximizing profits, exploiting local markets, repatriating earnings, safeguarding investments,
and control over management, is the interest of the host country in raising employment prospects (particularly in depressed areas), utilizing domestic sources of supply, maximizing tax revenue, increasing exports, providing technological advancement, and minimizing foreign control. While
in the short term, foreign investment will bring needed capital; in the
long term, 6 profits will exceed initial investment and there will be a re-

4. The author received his doctorate in 1971 from the Netherlands School of Economics, and now teaches at the Institute of Economic Science, University of Warsaw.
5. The author uses the abbreviation CMEA instead of COMECON.
6. Approximately five years.
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suiting negative flow of capital. 7 The author concludes as to the mutual
relations between MNE's and the states within which they operate, "one
cannot foresee much." s
While disclaiming any universal model, the author describes the SCE
as a large-scale, diversified entity characterized by a sharing of skills, lack
of competitiveness, and high efficiency. "In the framework of the planned
economy, the state as the owner of the productive capacities of the country is in the position to use its investment funds in a way which enables
their optimal utilisation and allocation, whereby the economies of scale
are realized. '"'
Western prices, according to the author, rely less on the cost of manufacture than the principle of supply and demand (an intrinsic or social
value greater than the sum of its parts). By comparison, the main objective of the SCE should be production at reduced costs on as large a scale
as possible, with price predicated on the lowest cost of production within
COMECON countries.
It is, of course, difficult to describe SCE's, as they are stated to be a
relatively recent phenomenon 0 and still in the formative stage." The author would like to see COMECON-wide ownership of SCE's, providing
common Socialist goals while recognizing employment, revenue, and other
interests peculiar to the host country. In 1976, the Comprehensive Program for the Development of Socialist Economic Integration and the Uniform Principles of Creation and Functioning of the International Economic Organizations were worked out. In the words of the author, these
were "rather vague and flexible."'
The author also poses the question whether or not foreign investment
is prompted by the initiative of the host country or that of the MNE. 1' In
the case of the Eastern European countries, the recurrent theme is a need
for hard currency-money with which to buy Western goods and technology. Hence the stress is on compensatory trade, counter-purchases, buyback arrangements, and even barter transactions. In any agreement to
transfer technology to the East, the level of reciprocal purchases will determine the available limits of royalties and sales into socialist countries.

7. This conclusion seems to ignore the benefit of an ongoing operation in terms of employment, reduction of imports, capital growth, etc.
8. In fact, the respective goals of each may not be as antagonistic as they appear at first
glance.
9. L. ZURAWICKI, supra note 1, at 99.
10. Within the last six years.
11. As of 1978, there were no more than a dozen SCE's.
12. L. ZURAWICKI, supra note 1, at 115. Actually, the Comprehensive Program was formalized in 1971. The best analysis of these documents in the overall Socialist context is R.
BysTmCKy, LE DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION ECONOMIQUE SocIAusT (1979). (Ed. note: Professor
Bystricky's book will be the subject of a review in an upcoming issue of the Denver Journal
of InternationalLaw and Policy).
13. Generally, a country's efforts to encourage foreign investment are inversely proportionate to full employment and a favorable balance of payments.
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These purchases often take the form of component sales to the Western
licensor-in the words of the author, the Eastern producer becomes a
"peripheral supplier of marginal components for the final product. 1 4
This, the author claims, is inequitable to the licensee since it is presumed
that the end product is more profitable than the individual component.
On a dollar invested basis, this premise might be challenged, particularly
when one views the relative profits made by the suppliers of small vendor
items to the auto industry in the United States. To better neutralize the
balance of payments, the author suggests that a list of components be
prepared and ranked by value, with the Eastern partner getting its fair
share of the higher value components.
"Ideological antagonisms" stand in the way of extensive joint ventures and capital cooperation between East and West. Capital investment
normally carries the expectation of ownership participation-a concept
incompatible with state-owned enterprises. MNE's are generally unattracted by passive investments and will not normally favor minority participation in the control of the venture, even with a more positive division
of profits. The limited duration of joint venture participation in
COMECON countries is an additional feature which discourages participation by Western MNE's, and in Yugoslavia repatriation of profits is
limited to a percentage of foreign exchange earned by the venture. Essentially, central economic planning, which is a prerequisite of socialist economies, forecloses any large-scale equity participation by Western enterprises.15 More realistic is the possibility raised by the author of an EastWest joint venture, limited to research and development, whereby technological exchange benefits both parties without the stress of foreign
intrusion.
The discussion ultimately points to the dilemma faced by developing
countries in attracting capital and technology and acquiring foreign-made
goods, while at the same time maintaining consistency with national eco-

14. L.

ZURAWICKI, supra note 1, at 146.
15. While it is probably unfair to review economic projections with the benefit of hindsight, it is interesting to note that the author refers to certain advantages of capital investment in Socialist countries, including "labourers, who as a rule do not go on strike," id. at
155, and "the fact that the socialist countries h'ave a good payment record, especially with
respect to large contracts," id. at 163. The former requires little comment in light of the
threat of Soviet intervention in Poland occasioned by chronic strikes over a number of
months. With respect to the record of payment, the Wall Street Journal has reported: "Together with Poland's staggering foreign debt and near bankruptcy, the shortages make economic conditions here among the worst faced by any industrial nation in recent history."
Wall St. J., June 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Summarizing the status on both points, a recent
newsbrief reported:
Moscow stepped up pressure on Poland, as Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov
said the Eastern bloc's military unity is needed 'to protect Socialist gains.' Poland's debt problems, meanwhile, are due to be addressed by Western creditors
in Paris. U.S. bankers favor freezing repayment until year-end if Poland discloses financial data.
Id., June 22, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
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nomic goals. Fundamental differences in underlying philosophies
(planned economy versus private enterprise) accentuate stresses inherent
in uneven rates of economic growth. Still, accommodation of competing
interests is more likely if motivations are clearly understood. In addition,
economic planning can be facilitated by introducing a level of predictability to the market place. Unfortunately, such an analysis is only as good as
the underlying premises, and not even pages of formulae can reduce market behavior to a mathematical science. In balance, the exercise is probably worthwhile, but ultimately the author concedes: "It is by no means
easy to plan in advance the volume of sales in Western markets as much
depends upon business cycles, the strategy and particular steps taken by
rivals, as well as on other more or less random factors."'

16. L.

ZURAWIKI,

supra note 1, at 166.

